Abstract: Vattimo's political liberalism often sits uncomfortably with his non-foundational commitments. The attempt to disentangle postmodern thought from moral relativism is seen as a disingenuous strategy: one either arbitrarily adopts liberal values or does so because it is part of our tradition, thus depending on the very metaphysical foundations which Vattimo denies to other thinkers. One answer may well be to distinguish metaphysics from ontology and show that Vattimo's justification of liberalism arises an oscillation between Heidegger and Nietzsche. However, the following article maintains that Vattimo's justification is often not properly understood because it is peculiarly Italian, seeking a plural account of truth derived from the human being's peculiar position as the imaginative creature.
Introduction: Vattimo's political liberalism
Like most late modern mainland European thinkers, Gianni Vattimo is sceptical of the putative neutrality and independence of the Enlightenment model of reason. Yet, whereas this suspicion in many of his contemporaries engenders a nostalgic mourning of the overcoming of modern rational tropes and a tendency for irresponsible play, for him it gives birth to the possibility of emancipation. His original contribution to the field of philosophy arises from his attempt to reconstruct a rationality out of the recognition of the interpretative, hermeneutic understanding of truth. The aims of the following discussion are to offer a better understanding of Vattimo's thought, to resolve a theoretical problem in his own work and, consequently, to offer a way out of a philosophical impasse about the nature and practicality of a more general philosophical idea. The general idea is the main concern of modernity. As Kant spurs one to do, one must only obey those edicts which can be rationalized and hence be one's own. Only in such a way can the oppression of others be resisted.
i However, whereas modernity was concerned with legitimacy and reason, late modernity, when one is made aware that the universal reason of the Enlightenment itself is an interested, historical construction, is concerned with the relationship between legitimacy and power.
To understand Vattimo's philosophy is, then, to think through the problems of our tradition: "the finitude that characterizes all of us and that rules out any complete conquest of the opacity that every person bears." ii This finitude is initially understood as the weakening of the Enlightenment project. When one's state, one's family, one's managers or others in general command, ask or plead that the agent do something, she appeals to her conscience to ask whether there are good reasons, whether reason itself can validate the request. If so, then the agent acts according to his or her own will and is self-determined. The aim of the Enlightenment was to liberate one from arbitrary wills, superstitions and ideology; to be the age of criticism.
iii Freedom was conceived as the subject's independence from power. And liberalism as a political creed is the protection and maintenance of the independent subject because a system of rights, the political virtues of tolerance, equality and free thought and the institutions of public education and democratic participation allow for the free thinking and acting subject.
Vattimo is not a liberal in this sense, as he recognizes the cultural constructivism inherent in liberal reason: "But what is called "world" is an outcome not only of interpretation but also of history: it is the result of the interpretative processes of others. Just like the subject is not something primordial or original, neither is the world that is always given as the outcome of other interpretations." iv As Vattimo has aged so his thought has become ever more overtly political and ethical. He perhaps always believed that hermeneutics and phenomenology were political engagements, but from the turn of the century his thought has drifted away from the interpretation and the non-grounding of hermeneutics as the koiné to which all other philosophies are mere reflected ideologies and towards the application or the practical consequences of (broadly conceived) hermeneutics' philosophical preeminence. The concern remains that this approach has ceded too much and political liberalism and that its values are relevant only to a specific society, that is, the society characterized by value pluralism. One can exhort fellow members of one's community to be liberal or lose their right to participate in dialogue because we share a pluralist culture, but when these values are used to criticize a monist society, a theocracy for example, then they have no more power than the monists' demand on us. The problem can be more readily expressed.
Vattimo's political liberalism, as expressed in his ethical and political writings, often sits uncomfortably with his non-foundational commitments. The attempt to disentangle postmodern thought from moral relativism is often seen as a disingenuous strategy: one either arbitrarily adopts liberal values (liberty, tolerance, equality respect) or does so because it is part of our tradition: "A philosophy that relies on a plurality of interpretations must avoid not only any metaphysical claims to universal values, which would restrict personal developments, but also that passive, conservative nature that characterizes descriptive philosophies in favor of action." xxiv The problem of the oscillation between tradition and reasons manifests itself in political and ethical concerns which are the main concern here, but also in a more general worry about the idea of hermeneutics as koiné. Valgenti sees the problem as inimical to hermeneutics in general and already present in Vattimo's mentor
Pareyson: "if we take interpretation as the point of departure, we risk proposing easy philosophical solutions, ones that do not problematize philosophy itself, but fall into dogmatism or skepticism, ideology or relativism. In Kant's view, common sense is merely appropriate for experience, while reason is the toll of speculation." xxv Readers of Vattimo suspect his position depends on the very metaphysical foundations which he denies to other thinkers. The strength of liberal Enlightenment thought is its universality. If it becomes communitarian or aware of its own tradition, it loses faith in its universality. If it, however, putatively assumes its universality and superiority, it becomes a comprehensive doctrine or a metaphysical system, and commits violence on those who would choose not to endorse its rules. (Unless it is true, which it cannot be because of the end of metaphysics.) For Vattimo, the imperative to situate oneself in relation to one's provenance, to heed one's heritage, does not distance one from it, but makes the subject aware of "inherited contents" that are necessary for a sense of objectivity through the rationality of constructed discourse. It is this oscillation between communitarianism, belonging to a community of late modern, enfeebled subjects, and the avowal of the universal need to resist violence which echoes the problem of political liberalism.
The possible solution may be a return to the idea of provenance and tradition. One naturally assumes that the opacity of Vattimo himself is the French-German philosophical tradition, which is geographically close to Northern Italy and dominant in his own education and writings. However, there is also the opacity of being Italian, a provenance which is often
forgotten and yet, perhaps, crucial in understanding his own unique contribution to the politics and ethics of our time. The present discussion aims to show how this forgotten heritage is significant and how it might reveal the distinctiveness of Vattimo's contribution to contemporary thought.
Provenance 1: the philosophical origins of Vattimo's thought as a possible indication of a solution
It is supposed that the philosophical provenance of Vattimo is the German postHeideggerian tradition of hermeneutics, initially through the influence of Pareyson and then through the teaching of Gadamer. Where Vattimo differs from the Heidegger explicitly is over the reintegration of Nietzsche into the postmetaphysical fold. The importance of tradition is, of course, to be found in his oscillation account of practical reason. xxvi Late modern culture makes stark the interested and pragmatic nature of "truth" as the Nietzschean account of ideology. The authentic subject must be able to recognize the historical nature and interest conditions of a particular presentation of the "truth" and stand back from it. However, the subject should simultaneously be aware that without the givenness of one's tradition, one has no language whatsoever through which to interpret at all:
At a time when, thanks to the Christianity that has permeated the history of our institutions as well as the history of our culture more generally, we have come to realize that the experience of truth is above all that of hearing and interpreting messages (even in the "hard sciences" there are paradigms, preunderstandings that we receive as messages), the Christian revelation has cogency insofar as we recognize that without it our historical existence would not make sense. The example of the "classics" of a literature, a language, a culture is illuminating here. Just as western literature would not be thinkable without its Homeric poems, without Shakespeare and Dante, our culture in its broadest sense would not make sense if we were to remove Christianity from it.
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The sense of objectivity in reasoning emerges from the conversation with one's tradition, otherwise the irony will be arbitrary and unintelligible. One can only be ironic with others and on the basis of shared expectations. It is when those expectations take on the veneer of natural right or absolute truth that the irony is persecuted. The subject oscillates between the transcendental refusal of the truth of the worldview (Nietzsche's irony) yet returns to it as the framework and language through which to move beyond it (Heidegger's conservatism). The "German" provenance or heritage of his thought opens up one obvious path to overcome the problem at the heart of Vattimo's political liberalism.
Nietzsche's ironic exhortation to continue to dream knowing one is dreaming is to reconstruct the enlightenment subject as a playful, comic interpreter of the current actuality.
The stance of the agent who would enter into dialogue is what Vattimo calls weakly nihilist:
the frameworks and languages of the comprehensive doctrines we bring to the negotiating table are known to be partial and interest-driven, and, with this knowledge, comes the refusal to impose them on others, especially in using violence. Knowing that what one would promote as worthwhile and valuable is merely an expression of one's own desires, preferences and cultural heritage has the consequence of weakening one's own commitment to it and, instead, seeing the values of tolerance, respect and liberty of others as entailed by the interpretative stance. Violence arises from the belief that one's truth is the whole truth, the one and only way to live, and one does a disservice to the other in order to make them live according to one's values and edicts. Metaphysical comprehensive beliefs --those characterized by monism, the belief that there is only one true description of ethical and epistemological reality --are violent because they seek to silence the inherent pluralism of our experience, a pluralism which given the social and cultural conditions of late modernity is more apparent than ever. Weak nihilism seems to be the equivalent of Rawls's step back from the metaphysical nature of comprehensive beliefs.
The problem is that philosophically one may well be convinced that truth and ethical value is never more than an interpretation and be unwilling to impose it on others. However, it is once more akin to Hume's rebuttal of scepticism in that one must still have commitments and beliefs to function day to day in the world. One cannot be ironic towards beliefs to such an extent that one is cynical and that means committing oneself to one set of values over others. Of course, for Vattimo, such a commitment is not a problem so long as the set of beliefs one commits to are not metaphysical or, to put it another way, the beliefs are consistent with the liberal values that make ironic interpretation rather than truth-saying The distinction between the subject conceived ontologically and the subject conceived metaphysically (which would be Vattimo's accusation against Rawls) depends for a large part on his use of Foucault's phrase the "ontology of actuality." xxxi It is his understanding of
Heidegger's edict to recollect Being as a response to the fragmentation of experience and reality in modernity and the specialization of discourses of knowledge leading to the death of philosophy. One must remember that Being is not but happens:
What it [recollecting thought] is listening to in its effort of recollection is not just the voices of some archaic primoridal mystery, supposedly drowned out by the vertiginous becoming of modernity; there is no origin located somewhere outside the actuality of the event. The event has its own thickness and certainly bears within it the traces of the past, but it is just as much composed of the voices of the present. And the past itself is something to which we gain access only through the part of it preserved down to us, its Wirkungsgeschichte. Since knowing that facts are interpretations relies on a specific social and epistemological crisis and that one response to this is the violent attempt to reimpose hegemonic understandings, even if different from those that have been lost, then emancipation will also be extinguished. Metaphysics, to repeat, is the symptom of violence and not its cause. The aim of hermeneutics as a practical philosophy seems, then, to be to resist power, to resist hegemony and to resist stability. Contrary to other forms of political liberalism, stability is violence and instability is peace.
However, such a distinction between metaphysics and ontology, though compelling, does not overcome the problem at the heart of political liberalism without further elucidation.
Stephen White, for one, agrees that ontological weakening might seem to be a solution, for as White himself stresses: "the current turn might now be seen as an attempt to think ourselves, and being in general, in ways that depart from the dominant --but now more problematic --ontological investments of modernity." xxxiv However, he is also quick to voice a suspicion of the distinction between metaphysics and ontology, hypothesizing that theoretically conventional entities in our discourses are not overcome by the "ontological turn" and immediately identifies one of the major entities as the coherent, rational, enlightened subject. xxxv Vattimo's ethical guidelines to appropriate interpretation seemingly reiterate enfeebled liberal tropes. White recognizes this as a general trend in postmodern thought, adding in a footnote, "The potential, ironic danger here is that the former image of subjectivity comes to look uncomfortably like the latter." xxxvi The problem with the ontology route is once again implicit in White's concern: the idea that under it all is a metaphysics of history which determines the opening, destiny and overcoming of modernity. Only at the end of history, in late modernity, is the proper comportment to generate a responsible interpretation possible. Not only is such an ontology controversial; it is akin to a metaphysics and, once more, for political liberalism, it begins to sound like a comprehensive doctrine grounds the putative neutrality of the political, negotiating agent in conversation. White's reading is sometimes at odds with Vattimo's own avowed understanding of the modern subject. xxxvii However, the debate seems to centre on the understanding of the philosophy of history in play and that is pertinent, whether such a philosophy of history is Hegelian (as White seems to assume but does not assert) or nihilistic (as Vattimo repeatedly states). Vattimo is at pains to differentiate his ontology of the present from a "mere" sociology through the elaboration of the philosophical attitude (and hence practice) par excellence of non-foundationalism. The assumptions of a theory are not tests to be either proven or rejected against some standard of human emancipation. Instead the situation is an understanding and hence an event of Being, yet it remains contingent on the unfolding destiny of an admittedly weakened philosophy of history. The postulation of a philosophy of history as White characterizes it, though, remains too Heideggerian (how metaphysics brings about oppression via the subject-object distinction) and not at all Italian.
Vattimo is not interested in the destiny of knowledge, value and the human; his thinking exists in the cracks and crises of thought. His pluralism is an event which needs to be sustained and maintained by an active politically liberal engagement, otherwise we fall once more into the violence of authoritarianism, tyranny and metaphysics.
Vattimo's political liberalism and his ethics of interpretation are possible as a consequence of the disorientation of the subject brought about by a fragmentation and secularization of culture. The subject is the product of a culture in crisis. On the one hand, the ethics of interpretation is a contingent response to a particular historical epoch or event, that is, it just happens to be the case that we live in a culture in crisis and hence we are weakly rational.
Political liberalism on such a reading is communitarian and dependent on the social thesis; it is not privileged above other homogenous cultures or historically prior cultures, but remains just an event or opening of thinking appropriate to our own contingent time. Such a reading, though, is at odds with Vattimo's affirmation that the end of metaphysics is to be understood as emancipation. xxxviii On the other hand, political liberalism and the ontology of actuality are a destiny and are privileged as a better way of understanding, hence progress over other
cultures. Yet, if this is so, Vattimo requires a proof of the metaphysical theory of history and he falls to White's criticism of his weak ontology.
There is an alternative. Vattimo could be understood as the philosopher of crisis because of his Italian provenance whereby pluralism is contingent and accidental (contrary to White's accusation) but to be maintained and supported because of weakly universal norms (contrary to relativism). There is a missing jigsaw piece in Vattimo's picture that would perhaps complete the picture. It hinges on his pluralism which is at odds with Heidegger's own "historical-destinal" xxxix narrative and not a response to the brute fact of multiculturalism as it is with most of the radical sceptics of the Anglo-american liberal tradition. White's concern with the weak ontology of Vattimo make sense if Vattimo is Heideggerian through and through. For Heidegger's conservatism and quietism asserts itself as a monism: the event of Being is epochal, it is given as a tradition. But Vattimo is a pluralist: the event of Being is also events of Being; the comprehensive doctrines which inform the agent's reasoning are not singular in each agent, but overlap in a particular postmodern subjectivity; the agent does not inherit a situation, a tradition, but situations and traditions, and is always already disorientated:
if there are no first supreme, universal principles, the only imperatives that would seem to count are those imposed by specific situations, but right here is where the difference looms between a postmetaphysical ethics and relativism pure and simple (assuming that there could ever be such a thing): the contestation that the credibility of first principles has evaporated does not translate into the assumption of our historical condition and of our belonging to a community as the only absolute. There is a story to be told in the history of thought about a possible world where the bifurcation which occurs as the dominance of the Church and its moral authority begins to decline, as the pluralism of thought engendered by the provision of education for non-clerical students and the rediscovery of ancient texts by a new middle class of leisure seekers, does not --after a crisis period --resolve itself into the stability and authority of natural science based on the philosophical methods of Galileo, Newton and Descartes. For Vattimo, contrary to Heidegger, it is dominion which establishes monism and not the other way around:
"Metaphysics is an aspect and a consequence of dominion, not its cause." xliii Italian
Humanism was explicitly an educational programme rather than a philosophical school, but it was the voice of this crisis. Just as the postmodern world is one of declining moral authority, the demystification of grand narratives and metaphysical pictures, so too was the world that gave birth to Italian thought. xliv It is a pertinent and plausible investigation to ask whether there exists a strain of humanism which remains in European thought and acts as a shadow, moving underneath the dominant positivisms of both empiricism and rationalism, and that such a thread can be traced as a geographical centre in the Italian tradition above all others. If so, it is worth thinking that Vattimo's own thought is the product of this tradition, and owes its provenance as much to it as to the acquired German and French thought in which he immersed himself. One feels that in the Italian tradition, born in the shadow of the homogeneity of an imperial religious theodicy, it is very different. The violence of tyranny is equated with stability and there is a need to resist the restructuring of social existence back once again into stability.
Again the pertinence of these words is paramount: "Metaphysics is an aspect and a consequence of dominion, not its cause." l Stability is then a difference from Rawls because violence is the drive to impose homogeneity and not the reaction to instability. humanism arose from the weakening of the Church's hegemonic power engendered by the concatenation of the rise of the commercial class and the nation state, the loss of papal moral authority, the privatization of education, the growth of individualism, reforming movements and the emergence of natural science as a new explanation of reality. The Church did not, of course, disappear but its "natural" right to rule and describe reality was enfeebled. In our own time, the metaphysics of correspondence is equally in crisis due to the explosion of the consuming class, dissolution of the nation state, the loss of science's moral authority, the commercialization of education, the suspicion of individualism, cultural difference movements and the "schools of suspicion" which undermine the privilege, based on claims to the objectivity or universality, of one discourse over others. The enfeebling of realism as the correct and only description of reality weakens its own "natural" right to found ethical and German could write such a thing, if one can forgive such lazy stereotypes.
